Fully Bread Fully God

[Ghosty]

Originally Posted by agiosotheos

The MOSC is one of the more Western influenced among those churches which have not chosen union with Rome, both from Roman and Anglican presence.

Makes sense, given their use of terminology. Since the Anglican Communion basically endorses the Protestant notion of Consubstantiation, it's not surprising that such a concept would be supported by a non-Catholic Apostolic Church that is heavily influenced by them. It would be interested to know what their beliefs were prior to exposure to European thought and definitions.

Peace and God bless!

[jimmy]

Ghosty, I am curious where you see the distinction between substance and accidents in the fathers, especially in their definitions. I have never seen them use the distinction.

[ByzCath]

Originally Posted by jimmy

Ghosty, I am curious where you see the distinction between substance and accidents in the fathers, especially in their definitions. I have never seen them use the distinction.

The use of the two different terms is a distinction. The fathers knew the work of the Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle. If they made no distinction between the two then they would not have used the different terms.

One must understand the philosophical thought behind these terms to understand their use. The fathers were not writing a philosophical treatise so I highly doubt that they would explain terms that they would assume those reading their writings would already know.

[jimmy]

Originally Posted by ByzCath

The use of the two different terms is a distinction. The fathers knew the work of the Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle. If they made no distinction between the two then they would not have used the different terms.

One must understand the philosophical thought behind these terms to understand their use. The fathers were not writing a philosophical treatise so I highly doubt that they would explain terms that they would assume those reading their writings would already know.

So are you saying that the distinction underlies their defiintions since they knew Aristotle even though it is not mentioned?

If that is the case I have a question. Would they with an idea (even if they don't state it in these words) that in the incarnation the humanity was transubstantiated into the divinity so that now all we have are the accidents of humanity with the substance of divinity?

[Ghosty]

Originally Posted by jimmy

Ghosty, I am curious where you see the distinction between substance and accidents in the fathers, especially in their definitions. I have never seen them use the distinction.

It's hard to pin down examples simply because they're everywhere. This distinction was crucial for the defining of the Trinity, for example. Those Arians who said that the Son was "like the Father" were using terminology that reflected a likeness in qualities, or accidents, while the orthodox Fathers insisted that the Father and Son were the same substance. You won't necessarily find the terms themselves translated into English as we use them here, but the Cappadocian Fathers, for example, use this distinction often when explaining how the Trinity can be one essence or substance, but Three persons.

So it's more in conceptual use than in direct terminology. This is because, as ByzCath pointed out, the concepts were simply common knowledge among Greek speakers who grew up studying Aristotle and Plato. So when the Fathers talk about how the "what" of God is not only the same type, but identical and one among the Trinity, but that the Persons are distinguished by unique personal properties, they are utilizing the commonly understood and accepted distinction between substance and accidents.

That being said, I'm not aware of any examples in the Early Church where the distinction is so clearly used to describe the Eucharist as it was to explain the Trinity. Doesn't mean they aren't there, just that I've not devoted as much time to the question of the Eucharist since it's not a dividing issue between Apostolic Churches, while issues like explaining the Trinity, or the Incarnation, have been.

If that is the case I have a question. Would they with an idea (even if they don't state it in these words) that in the incarnation the humanity was transubstantiated into the divinity so that now all we have are the accidents of humanity with the substance of divinity?

I think this would basically be the argument of Eutyches, which is rejected by all Apostolic Churches, even those that were accused of following him. Since the humanity (substance) of Christ remains and is unchanged by the presence of the Divine Nature (substance), it would seem to follow that the human nature in us remains as well.

Peace and God bless!

[jimmy]

Originally Posted by Ghosty

It's hard to pin down examples simply because they're everywhere. This distinction was crucial for the defining of the Trinity, for example. Those Arians who said that the Son was "like the Father" were using terminology that reflected a likeness in qualities, or accidents, while the orthodox Fathers insisted that the Father and Son were the same substance. You won't necessarily find the terms themselves translated into English as we use them here, but the Cappadocian Fathers, for example, use this distinction often when explaining how the Trinity can be one essence or substance, but Three persons.

I think to say this reflects a subconscious substance/accidents distinction is to read into it.

So it's more in conceptual use than in direct terminology. This is because, as ByzCath pointed out, the concepts were simply common knowledge among Greek speakers who grew up studying Aristotle and Plato. So when the Fathers talk about how the "what" of God is not only the same type, but identical and one among the Trinity, but that the Persons are distinguished by unique personal properties, they are utilizing the commonly understood and accepted distinction between substance and accidents.

I don't think Aristotle played as much a role as you are saying. The culture was neo-Platonist which was a reinterpretation of Plato. Aristotle might have played a role in the development of thought for the Greek world but it isn't a central role like Plato had. Plato was like scripture for the Greek philosophers of the patristic age. I am not trying to contrast Plato and Aristotle but Aristotle seems to play a more tangential role and consequently less essential to their philosophy.

I think this would basically be the argument of Eutyches, which is rejected by all Apostolic Churches, even those that were accused of following him. Since the humanity (substance) of Christ remains and is unchanged by the presence of the Divine Nature (substance), it would seem to follow that the human nature in us remains as well.

Peace and God bless!

Yes, it sounds like Eutyches.

My point is the only concrete place this distinction could have been utilized, in the incarnation, does not take advantage of it. To take advantage of it implies Eutychianism.

[Ghosty]

I don't think Aristotle played as much a role as you are saying. The culture was neo-Platonist which was a reinterpretation of Plato. Aristotle might have played a role in the development of thought for the Greek world but it isn't a central role like Plato had. Plato was like scripture for the Greek philosophers of the patristic age. I am not trying to contrast Plato and Aristotle but Aristotle seems to play a more tangential role and consequently less essential to their philosophy.

Even though I believe you're overstating Plato's role, it really doesn't make a difference. The distinction between substance and accidents is specifically FROM Plato; Aristotle merely carried the idea of his mentor. It is Platonic Realism that puts forth the distinction, as other Greek philosophies prior to Plato taught that the only substances were the foundational elements, like water or fire, which compose what we might call accidents under Realist philosophies. It was Plato who introduced the concept that that there was a substance underlying these things, which he called forms. The accidents of the forms made things individual, but the "whatness" of the thing existed apart from the qualities of the thing. So, for example, a circle is a circle regardless of its size or material, and it is a really existing substance of its own in which these traits, like size and material, apply to but don't fundamentally define.

Aristotle really didn't do anything new with regards to the distinction between substance and accidents, he carried Plato's idea all the way. The difference that Aristotle held was that the substances needn't exist in an "ideal form" seperately from the accidents, as Plato held (Plato believed that there was an "ideal circle" that all circles share in, and are distinguished from eachother only by the accidental features). Aristotle believed that substances were real, and distinct from accidents, but that the substances fully existed with the accidents, and not as a seperate reality unto themselves. So circle is a real substance, a real definitive thing in itself, but there is no "ideal circle" floating around in a realm of ideals. Aristotle put the hypostasis (individual) as primary, and Plato put the general, common substance as being primary with the hypostasis following upon it.

So, in short, the distinction between substance and accidents is fundamentally Platonic and Realist, and comes directly from Plato's dispute with those who claimed that there was no underlying substance or form of things. Basically his rival contemporaries believed much as materialists do today, and he put forth this theory to contest their viewpoint.

My point is the only concrete place this distinction could have been utilized, in the incarnation, does not take advantage of it. To take advantage of it implies Eutychianism.

The distinction is made within the Incarnation without any need to fall into Eutychianism. For example, the accident of material flesh was accepted as real, and applied to the substance of human nature, but not to the Divine Nature of Christ. This is the very heart of the debate over the Incarnation.

I honestly have no idea why you would say that the distinction would lead to Eutychianism if applied to the Incarnation. What leads to Eutychianism is to say that the substance of humanity vanishes in the Incarnation, but that is in no way necessitated by the distinction of substance and accidents.

Peace and God bless!

[jimmy]

Originally Posted by Ghosty

The distinction is made within the Incarnation without any need to fall into Eutychianism. For example, the accident of material flesh was accepted as real, and applied to the substance of human nature, but not to the Divine Nature of Christ. This is the very heart of the debate over the Incarnation.

Could you restate that in different language? I have no idea what you mean in this paragraph. What are you talking about 'the accident of material flesh was accepted as real, and applied to the substance of human nature, but not to the Divine Nature of Christ.'? And how does this relate to the debate over the Incarnation?

I honestly have no idea why you would say that the distinction would lead to Eutychianism if applied to the Incarnation. What leads to Eutychianism is to say that the substance of humanity vanishes in the Incarnation, but that is in no way necessitated by the distinction of substance and accidents.

I applied the distinction in the same way Thomas applied it to the Eucharist. It implies Eutychianism.

[Ghosty]

Originally Posted by jimmy

Could you restate that in different language? I have no idea what you mean in this paragraph. What are you talking about 'the accident of material flesh was accepted as real, and applied to the substance of human nature, but not to the Divine Nature of Christ.'? And how does this relate to the debate over the Incarnation?

I'm referring to how the substance/accident distinction applies to the Incarnation, and how it was utilized in defining the Dogmas relating to it. Basically the Incarnation was defined in such a way that the accidents of human nature (flesh, materiality, emotions) didn't apply to the Divine Nature. In the debates that led to the defining of the Dogma, it was these issues that were hashed out, and it's how we finally ended with the definitions we have, namely that the qualities (accidents) of human nature (substance) don't apply to the Divine Nature (substance), but they do apply to the hypostasis/subsistence.

Essentially my point is that all the major Dogmas of the Incarnation rely on the distinction of substance and accidents.

I applied the distinction in the same way Thomas applied it to the Eucharist. It implies Eutychianism.

I don't see how the discussion of transubstantiation applies to the Incarnation at all. Aquinas does not say that two substances can't occupy the same place (indeed, the soul and the body are two substances, but occupy the same place) so there no reason to apply transubstantiation to the Incarnation in which the Divine substance and the human substance occupy the same space.

Peace and God bless!

[agiosotheos]

Originally Posted by Ghosty

If both substances remained there would be grounds to say that grinding up the Eucharist under your foot was merely attacking bread and not Christ.

How does this make sense? If both substances remain then both bread and Body are being desecrated.

Originally Posted by Ghosty

The only other way around this problem would be to say that even though you are crushing bread it is actually Christ also, which would imply that Christ has the texture and qualities of bread,

How is that not the case with transubstantiation?

Originally Posted by Ghosty

Instead it uses a 16th century Protestant term as its reference point. It might as well have said that Calvin's TULIP formula is the traditional Orthodox understanding of slavation. It's questionable not just because of what it says, but in the fact that it references a recent Protestant formula (unless you can show that "consubstantiation" was used prior to the Reformation) and not any statements made by Apostolic Fathers.

That's absurd. Introducing new formulas for defining the faith does not necessarily mean that a different faith is being expressed. Given your line of thinking we may as well throw out homoousios because it wasn't used by any of the Apostolic Fathers.

[agiosotheos]

Originally Posted by Ghosty

Makes sense, given their use of terminology. Since the Anglican Communion basically endorses the Protestant notion of Consubstantiation, it's not surprising that such a concept would be supported by a non-Catholic Apostolic Church that is heavily influenced by them. It would be interested to know what their beliefs were prior to exposure to European thought and definitions.

Peace and God bless!

They weren't even really Oriental Orthodox before that point. Their main contact with any other church body throughout most of their history was Seleucia (i.e. the Assyrian Church of the East). Then the Roman church came and took over in the early 16th century. The OO did not show up until the late 17th century via the Syriac Orthodox Church.

[Ghosty]

How is that not the case with transubstantiation?

The teaching of transubstantiation is that the accidents of bread and wine remain, but Christ does not aquire those accidents. They are miraculously suspended without inhering in any substance whatsoever. So Christ does not suddenly look like bread and wine, He remains as He is and was at the Ascension.

That's absurd. Introducing new formulas for defining the faith does not necessarily mean that a different faith is being expressed. Given your line of thinking we may as well throw out homoousios because it wasn't used by any of the Apostolic Fathers.

That's the thing, homoousios WAS used by the Apostolic Fathers to define the Faith that had been handed down. It is telling that in expressing this belief, the website you cited does not cite any of its own traditional Fathers or sources, but only cites a very specific 16th century Protestant formula. If it is the traditional Faith being expressed, I hope to see some traditional sources for it rather than the then-novel teachings of Martin Luther.

They weren't even really Oriental Orthodox before that point. Their main contact with any other church body throughout most of their history was Seleucia (i.e. the Assyrian Church of the East). Then the Roman church came and took over in the early 16th century. The OO did not show up until the late 17th century via the Syriac Orthodox Church.

This is why it would be interesting to see some authentically Assyrian or Indian references to the nature of the Eucharist, if such things even exist.

Peace and God bless!

[Ghosty]

It occured to me that in this discussion we never pointed out the words of the Anaphora of St. John Chrysostom, the primary Byzantine Liturgy. Here are a couple of translations:

And make this bread the precious Body of Thy Christ. (Amen)
And that which is in this cup, the precious Blood of Thy Christ. (Amen)
Making the change by the Holy Spirit. (Amen, Amen, Amen )

and:

And may He make this bread the Body + + + of Christ our God.

People: Amen.

And this cup may He perfect into the Blood + + + of Christ our God.

Clearly a change from bread and wine into the Body and Blood is spoken of, and not some co-mingling as defined by Consubstantiation. Indeed, Consubstantiation teaches that there is no change, but rather that Christ comes to dwell alongside the bread and wine; clearly that is not the case in Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom.

A very real change, from bread and wine into Christ, takes place.

Peace and God bless!

[SyroMalankara]

The OO do NOT believe in Consubstantiation as taught by protestants - they may have used that term, but it is meant in another context - simply that Jesus is fully and completely present and the form of bread remains.