Poll: Is conceptual thought possible without language?

[Qoeleth]

Is language co-originary with conceptual thought? To me, following Saussare, it would seem so, more or less. One can't really think of something (a concept, an emotion, a class of object) unless one has a word for it.

On the other hand, Aristotle says that concepts exist before words, and that words vary from person to person (i.e. from language to language) but all people have the same concepts.

Can you think of a concept without using words? If so, how can the concept be rendered comprehensible, even to oneself?

[thewanderer]

I think language is extremely important for thought, but we can use images and other sensible memories to represent at least some thoughts. For instance, picturing the colour red can bring to mind the concept of redness even if you don't use the word red. It takes a couple of tries and seems strange because its not what we're used to, but I definitely think it is possible!

[SonCatcher]

Language can be cumbersome if you happen to be examining an object in your thoughts. Especially if that object has 5 or 6 dimensions.

[bscastro]

I'm not an expert or anything, but I would agree from personal experience that conceptual images appear without language in my mind. Often, I don't have words to succinctly express the thoughts in my mind.

As an example, when I played chess, I would conceive of a strategy in my mind without putting words to it - I would just see an image or specific chess positions.

Of course, to express it I would have to use words or draw it out, but the actual concept of the strategy was in my head before the language used to describe it.

God bless,
Bryan

[tonyrey]

1. Consciousness is a mystery and so is conceptual thought.

2. Sometimes we have ideas we cannot express with words.

3. They are the result of intuition or insight we cannot explain even to ourselves.

4. Our power of abstraction is similar to our power of decision-making.

5. They are both aspects of mental activity that cannot nor ever will be explained by science.

6. The mind cannot be reduced to physical events because it is a fundamental reality.

[tonyrey]

Originally Posted by bscastro

I'm not an expert or anything, but I would agree from personal experience that conceptual images appear without language in my mind. Often, I don't have words to succinctly express the thoughts in my mind.

As an example, when I played chess, I would conceive of a strategy in my mind without putting words to it - I would just see an image or specific chess positions.

Of course, to express it I would have to use words or draw it out, but the actual concept of the strategy was in my head before the language used to describe it.

God bless,
Bryan

There are abstract principles we cannot visualise.

[JDaniel]

Originally Posted by Qoeleth

Is language co-originary with conceptual thought? To me, following Saussare, it would seem so, more or less. One can't really think of something (a concept, an emotion, a class of object) unless one has a word for it.

On the other hand, Aristotle says that concepts exist before words, and that words vary from person to person (i.e. from language to language) but all people have the same concepts.

Can you think of a concept without using words? If so, how can the concept be rendered comprehensible, even to oneself?

Qoeleth:

Higher level conceptual thought seems to require language. I'm not so sure about lower level thought. It is nearly impossible for us to think conceptually now, because we all know the words - we can describe things even if the descriptions are poor. The words are present to our minds the instant that we perceive an object of thought.

A simple example of lower level conceptual thought might be the comparison between two different fruit items, e.g., an apple and an orange. A language-less caveman can experience each with all of his senses, and retain appropriate concepts about them that are wordless. For example, the orange is obviously different in color, obviously different in outside texture, obviously different in odor, obviously different in mass properties, and obviously different in taste. A rather complete conception of such a comparison can be accomplished without language, and the pictures will remain in his memory until he dies.

Another simple conceptual comparison is between animate things and inanimate things. The language-less caveman will instantly know the difference between a statue of a leopard and a real leopard as soon as he assuages his reactive principle with the fact that one has no mobility.

God bless,
jd

[SonCatcher]

Originally Posted by JDaniel

Qoeleth:

Higher level conceptual thought seems to require language. I'm not so sure about lower level thought. It is nearly impossible for us to think conceptually now, because we all know the words - we can describe things even if the descriptions are poor. The words are present to our minds the instant that we perceive an object of thought.

A simple example of lower level conceptual thought might be the comparison between two different fruit items, e.g., an apple and an orange. A language-less caveman can experience each with all of his senses, and retain appropriate concepts about them that are wordless. For example, the orange is obviously different in color, obviously different in outside texture, obviously different in odor, obviously different in mass properties, and obviously different in taste. A rather complete conception of such a comparison can be accomplished without language, and the pictures will remain in his memory until he dies.

Another simple conceptual comparison is between animate things and inanimate things. The language-less caveman will instantly know the difference between a statue of a leopard and a real leopard as soon as he assuages his reactive principle with the fact that one has no mobility.

God bless,
jd

While language helps in forming foundational concepts, expansion beyond the foundations can indeed start as non-linguistic and only become linguistic out of necessity to describe the expansions to others.

[TS Aquinas]

Originally Posted by Qoeleth

Is language co-originary with conceptual thought? To me, following Saussare, it would seem so, more or less. One can't really think of something (a concept, an emotion, a class of object) unless one has a word for it.

On the other hand, Aristotle says that concepts exist before words, and that words vary from person to person (i.e. from language to language) but all people have the same concepts.

Can you think of a concept without using words? If so, how can the concept be rendered comprehensible, even to oneself?

Let's observe qualia, can the first person experience of qualia be logically communicable in an objective third person point of view? Can't be done, try explaining redness to a born blind person or Bach Sarabande 996 to a born complete deaf person.

[SonCatcher]

Originally Posted by TS Aquinas

Let's observe qualia, can the first person experience of qualia be logically communicable in an objective third person point of view? Can't be done, try explaining redness to a born blind person or Bach Sarabande 996 to a born complete deaf person.

[Qoeleth]

Originally Posted by JDaniel

Qoeleth:

Higher level conceptual thought seems to require language. I'm not so sure about lower level thought. It is nearly impossible for us to think conceptually now, because we all know the words - we can describe things even if the descriptions are poor. The words are present to our minds the instant that we perceive an object of thought.

A simple example of lower level conceptual thought might be the comparison between two different fruit items, e.g., an apple and an orange. A language-less caveman can experience each with all of his senses, and retain appropriate concepts about them that are wordless. For example, the orange is obviously different in color, obviously different in outside texture, obviously different in odor, obviously different in mass properties, and obviously different in taste. A rather complete conception of such a comparison can be accomplished without language, and the pictures will remain in his memory until he dies.

Another simple conceptual comparison is between animate things and inanimate things. The language-less caveman will instantly know the difference between a statue of a leopard and a real leopard as soon as he assuages his reactive principle with the fact that one has no mobility.

God bless,
jd

I wonder- would the determination of the classes "apple" and "orange" coincide with the emergence of a word for "apple" and "orange"? Would an animal without language see "apples" or "oranges" as members of classes, or just individual bits of food?

The example of the inanimate and animate objects ia good one- and I suppose the words "animate" and "inanimate" would proably not emerge until language reached a fairly advanced state. Yet, would the different reactions to a statue of a leopard and a real leopard be based on their respective status as classes of object (inanimate vs. animate) or simply on them as different individual 'things'?

[Qoeleth]

Originally Posted by SonCatcher

While language helps in forming foundational concepts, expansion beyond the foundations can indeed start as non-linguistic and only become linguistic out of necessity to describe the expansions to others.

I agree. Concepts can be expanded without language, in the form of wandering or exploring thoughts. But, to create new/expanded concepts, it would seem that they need to be defined.

If one thinks of something, doesn't it become a 'concept' precisely at the moment it is 'defined' into a more-or-less fixed form. It would seem that a concept needs to be iterable to be a concept (as opposed to a thought). Now, isn't an iterable concept basically a 'word', or at least a proto-word.

Imagine the word "triangle" didn't exist. And I thought of a triangle. I would need to define that though in order for it to become a concept. Wouldn't the emergence of the definition of such a concept be basically the same as the emergence of the word "triangle" (or some combination of words which stood for the same concept)?

[Alberti_Devoveo]

Originally Posted by Qoeleth

Imagine the word "triangle" didn't exist. And I thought of a triangle. I would need to define that though in order for it to become a concept. Wouldn't the emergence of the definition of such a concept be basically the same as the emergence of the word "triangle" (or some combination of words which stood for the same concept)?

Recall that Saussure was all about signs & the signified, (a fancy linguistic way of saying words & ideas). If you thought of something new (the signified), then you would need a way to communicate the new (signs). Signs can take the form of written words, oral words, images, etc. Anything is a sign to Saussure, and each signified has a particular sign (though the sign can change from language to language due to the difference languages).

[Qoeleth]

Originally Posted by Alberti_Devoveo

Recall that Saussure was all about signs & the signified, (a fancy linguistic way of saying words & ideas). If you thought of something new (the signified), then you would need a way to communicate the new (signs). Signs can take the form of written words, oral words, images, etc. Anything is a sign to Saussure, and each signified has a particular sign (though the sign can change from language to language due to the difference languages).

If I may clarify Saussare- his meaning of 'sign' was a little different from the usual one, where the 'sign' point to/stands for the signified. He regarded the "sign" as a complex of both the the signifier and the signified. So, the signified (e.g. the three sided-shape) and the signified (the word "triangle"), together form the unity of 'the sign.'

His contention was that concepts remain nebulous and undefined, until defined in words or other signifiers.

[TS Aquinas]

Originally Posted by Qoeleth

If I may clarify Saussare- his meaning of 'sign' was a little different from the usual one, where the 'sign' point to/stands for the signified. He regarded the "sign" as a complex of both the the signifier and the signified. So, the signified (e.g. the three sided-shape) and the signified (the word "triangle"), together form the unity of 'the sign.'

His contention was that concepts remain nebulous and undefined, until defined in words or other signifiers.

But what of signs that can only be defined to the agent by first person experience? "Mary's Room" thought experiment comes to mind.