How is Truth possible?

[Qoeleth]

It would seem that any proposition asserted as truth either is:
1) analytically true, i.e. true by definition, e.g. "1 + 1 = 2", where "2" is defined as the sum of 1 + 1. In which case there would seem to be circularity of reason; OR
2) is dependent upon another premise, e.g. "War is bad", is dependent upon the assertion, "peace is good", which then perhaps depends upon "happiness is good" (which is perhaps analytically true- and thus circular). Or, perhaps we reach a point were our conclusions depend upon an unsupported premise. The only other possibility would seem to be an infinite regress of premises, which is held to be impossible.

So, it seems there are three options- all purported truths are either:
1) circular,
2) depending upon some other premise which is unsupported,
3) depending upon some other premise which is circular, or
4) depending upon an infinite regression of premises.

So, how then is any truth claim sustainable?

[theblindlead]

here is a paper i wrote on pyrrohonian skepticism which is what your talking about

Intro to Pyrrhonian Skepticism
It is truly amazing that when one is talking to a child below the age of ten that the conversation normally sounds like a person talking to someone who believes in Pyrrhonian skepticism. The conversation with the five year old normally goes something like this. “Mommy why do people die?” “Well people die because they get old.” “Well, why do people get old?” “Because old is a measure of time and the more time we spend on earth the older we are.” “Why is that?” At this point the mother of the child normally retorts with “because that is what happens.” And the child goes “why?” and the mother then says “because it does” and the conversation is over. The only difference between a Pyrrhonian Skeptic and a little child, besides age, is the Pyrrhonian Skeptic will not stop asking questions after the second “because that is just the way that it is,” answer.

The Pyrrhonian skeptic will state that knowledge is impossible because every predicate term has a derivative. What is being used is called the infinite regress argument which states: how do we know that X is true, well we know this because of X1. How do we know that X1 is true, because of X2¬. How do we know that X2 is true, because of X3. This logic according to a Pyrrhonian skeptic must regress to infinity, for if it does not regress to infinity then it is impossible to prove that anything is true. This is why a Pyrrhonian skeptic would say that knowledge is impossible. So they will state that the only thing that is certain or true is that we no nothing. I would like to point out but not dwell upon the obvious logical contradiction of this statement. While some Pyrrhonian skeptics will not go as far as to say that they are certain that we cannot know anything and that they just suspend judgment upon everything, for the sake of this paper these viewpoints shall be considered undistinguishable.

I will argue that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is false, and that knowledge is attainable. The major argument that is used against Pyrrhonian Skepticism is called Foundationalism. Foundationalism will be discussed, in detail, to show why Pyrrhonian Skepticism is false, and knowledge is, in fact, attainable.

Foundationalism
Foundationalism states that there does not need to be an infinite regress of explanations to prove that something is true. It states that there are certain principles that are foundational to all others, thus there need not be a derivative to prove that they are true but rather they are true. There are a number of different metaphors that are used to prove this point but the most commonly used one is the castle wall metaphor. This metaphor states that our knowledge is very much like the wall of a castle in that the bricks that are higher up have many derivatives or predicates to hold them up. This wall no matter how high must be built upon or predicated upon a base layer of brick before you can build anything else. Thus the belief system that we follow, like the castle wall, is held up by certain basic principles. The more justified that our foundational beliefs are the stronger our beliefs that proceed from these beliefs become. If as a Foundationalist claims there are certain beliefs that are true and foundational to all other believes this would make Foundationalism the best and most accurate way to find certainty of beliefs.

The Foundationalist will also state that logical reasoning is not circular, as the Coherentist states. Coherentists like to use the metaphor of a spider web to illustrate their point. This metaphor is a bad one, a better one would be M.C. Escher’s descending or ascending staircase. This image is one that would make more sense describing Coherentism since it does not make sense. Escher’s painting is a nonsensical image. It is one that can only be formed on paper but is impossible to actually create in real life, such is Coherentism. It is possible to present an argument for Coherentism on paper but when it is applied to real life it falters.

[theblindlead]

Justified Belief
So, if some beliefs are foundational to all other beliefs, how are we sure that our foundational beliefs are true. If we have false foundational beliefs then the rest of our beliefs will most likely be false. By saying that our foundational beliefs are true I do not believe that it is possible to actually have beliefs that are one hundred percent certain or true that occur outside the context of the human mind. What I will argue is that we can be so close to certainty with many of the different beliefs that we would consider to be foundational that this near certainty overcomes skepticism, and gives us the ability to have true beliefs. Near certainty will be defined as things that are brought as close to truth as human faculties will allow, For I will contend that the only things that humans can know for certain must come from the human mind and be things such as loving, caring and existence.

For individuals to have the ability to overcome skepticism they must first and foremost care about finding the truth, and they must have epistemic trust in their cognitive abilities and the cognitive abilities of others. If they do not care about having true beliefs there will be no reason for them to actually come to a true belief. It they have no desire for the truth they could come to a false conclusion and not care that it is false therefore undermining their ability to have true beliefs in that realm. The individuals also need to have trust in their epistemic ability’s, for if they have no trust in their sense perceptions the farthest that they get is that they can know that they are a thinking thing and everything after that is unattainable. To actually make judgments about the world the individual must actually be able to connect with that world in some way shape or form. The only way for human beings to connect to the world is through our senses therefore we must assume that our sense perceptions are ones that are legitimate. We must also assume that the sense perceptions of others are functioning correctly as well, for the vast majority of information that we learn comes from other individuals not from our own senses. Assuming that other individuals are working with the same sense equipment that you are there should not, under normal circumstances, be a reason to distrust their epistemic abilities. This is known as intellectual egalitarianism or that those whose epistemic faculties are on the same playing field as yours, thoughts, should not be rejected upon the basis that they did not come from your sense experience.

For individuals to have knowledge that would be considered foundational to all other beliefs they need to have beliefs that are justified. Beliefs that are justified are beliefs that have gone through the proper chain of reasoning and are reliably produced. Obviously for this to occur, at least when talking about beliefs that have any bearing to the world outside our minds, we need to have trust in our epistemic abilities. Now having justified beliefs does not entail that our beliefs are true but it does take a huge step towards truth. Gettier problems prove that justified beliefs do not always correlate to knowledge but these beliefs are the best that we can do. The Gettier problems present a problem for epistemologists but I do not think that these problems are damming to any movement that attempts to oppose skepticism. I would like to present three arguments as to why our cognitive abilities are worthy of taking justified true beliefs as knowledge and using them to support foundationalism.

The first of these is the argument for an omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent God that was put forth by Descartes, which will be slightly modified to prove that we can trust our epistemic abilities to the point that we can be sure enough of out justified true beliefs that we can say that they are so close to knowledge that we can use them as foundational beliefs. Descartes argues that if individuals have an idea of perfection, then there must exist a perfect being as its cause. He then states that individuals do have an idea of perfection therefore there must exist a perfect being (God). Descartes then goes on to state that God is not a deceiver, since deception would be an imperfection. God created me with certain senses that indicate the ability to understand and perceive the worlds around me; therefore my epistemic sense must not be deceiving me as long as I am using them in a proper manner. For this we can state that we can have justified beliefs that are close to truth if not truth themselves, therefore we could say that there are certain things that are foundational to others because we have beliefs that are as close to truth as possible it not truth themselves.

[theblindlead]

The second argument for the existence of foundational principles that knowledge is based upon comes from the Constructive Dilemma Argument. This argument does not prove so much so that our beliefs that are true are justified but rather that we should consider things foundational to knowledge even if they are false. The Constructive Dilemma goes like this: people who are skeptics attempt to have people move from a belief that something is true/ false to the doubt in the validity of anything. In moving from belief to doubt we are either moving from believing what is true to doubt, or we are moving from believing what is false to doubt. If we are moving from believing something that is true to doubt we are losing connection to reality. If we move from a false belief to a state of doubt, we move from a failed connection to reality to another failed connection to reality. The new failed connection to reality is just lacking a belief altogether. Either way doubt does not seem to be a conscientious epistemic state. For either you lose a true belief or you lose a false belief but are still in the same spot had you not lost your false belief. This argument helps prove that knowledge while it is not one-hundred percent certain is still better than skepticism.

The third and final argument (present here) for justified beliefs is the moral argument or that all of our actions are dependent upon our beliefs; we cannot conscientiously act unless we have some conscientious belief that we are acting upon. Skeptical doubt undermines conscientious actions making it impossible for the skeptic to act. This argument is a big one for the fact that having these justified beliefs as foundational principles makes individuals conscientiously able to act without these foundational principles life as we know it would be impossible.

Now that justified belief has been shown to be for all intents and purposes as good a knowledge, I will answer some objections to my current proposal against Pyrrhonian Skepticism.

Objections & Answers
The Biggest objection that is always made about foundationalism is that it seems that there are not things that are foundational to knowledge. I would contend that many of the things that have been previously mentioned are foundational to knowledge such as one must care about find the truth. Even someone who objects to foundationalism should grant that caring about finding the true is clearly foundational. There is really no way to prove to another person that you care about something but humans as a whole care about thousand s of things a day. Of all the things which humans care about truth is the one that is the most important when talking about epistemology. Another belief that is clearly foundational to all other beliefs is “cogito ergo sum,” in English “I think therefore I am.” It is impossible to deny the validity of this claim. Love would also be considered a foundational belief to all others. Just like caring I can be certain that I love others, for even if those individuals who I love do not exist I still have love even if the love is directed towards things that are false. The last and most important foundational principle to all knowledge is trust in ones epistemic abilities. Since this principle is foundational to knowledge, outside the mind, it is horribly hard to prove without being circular, but it seems that foundational principles that reach beyond the human mind are impossible to prove since we cannot say that they are foundational to the mind but they do not have any predicate outside the mind to be based upon. We must accept that our epistemic connection to reality is a truth bearing one because that idea is the basis for all truth outside the mind. Now I presented Descartes Eidological proof for the existence of a God earlier that hopefully convinces most that about the reliability of our epistemic faculties but for those that were not convinced I would like to present another argument for trust in our epistemic abilities. It is clear that things inside human minds can be foundational and true without having need for evidence/predictable for them to be one hundred percent true. Things outside our minds can be know for sure if humans can have trust in their cognitive faculties. Most people would just accept for granted that their epistemic faculties are reliable ones, which confer true information and I would argue that this is the correct thing to do. By their definition things that are foundational that are outside of our minds are impossible to prove with certitude but I do not think that this weakens the argument for them being true, nearly as much as the skeptics would have you believe. I would argue that the burden for proof against this foundational principle would fall on the shoulders of the skeptic. Skeptics must show that the whole of our beliefs are false before they can make the claim against knowledge but they cannot do this. All they have the ability to do is say that since we cannot prove foundationalism with one hundred percent certainty everyone should give up on knowledge and become a skeptic. Their argument is equivalent to an idiot sitting on a park bench who convinces you to take all the money out of your back account and buy Powerball tickets because there is just as good of a possibility of winning the lottery as not. It would seem only a fool would do this just as only a fool would say that knowledge is impossible just because it is not provable with certitude.

Conclusion
In conclusion knowledge is possible despite what the Pyrrhonian Skeptic would say. While truth outside the realm of the mind must be coined as near certitude, this near certitude is as close as humanly possible to get to truth. This near certitude is so close to truth that only a foolish person would try and deny its validity.

[theblindlead]

if for some reason you don't want to read all of that (i can't imagine why) a really basic answer would be Descartes "cogito ergo sum" "I think therefore i am"

personally i prefer St. Augustine's "Sic Fallor sum" "I Fail therefore I am" this one predates descartes by 1000 years and Augustine was actually using it to refute pyrr. skepticism he was saying that even if he fails to prove his point by having the ability to fail he still is

[Charlemagne II]

How is truth not possible?

Maybe you could define your term?

How do you define truth?

[Qoeleth]

Originally Posted by theblindlead

Conclusion
In conclusion knowledge is possible despite what the Pyrrhonian Skeptic would say. While truth outside the realm of the mind must be coined as near certitude, this near certitude is as close as humanly possible to get to truth. This near certitude is so close to truth that only a foolish person would try and deny its validity.

Thanks for your response, which seems to have considered the issues very comprehensively. You seem to have answered the question very well.
I may ask a couple of questions in turn to various points raised:
1) You agree that the coherence model of truth basically leads to circularity? I agree. Possible something is gained in the journey, even if it does turn out to be circular. Are all mathematical truths based on a coherence model of truth?
2) The idea of caring about truth does indeed seem to be necessary. But isn’t this preference for truth over falsehood something which can be established analytically- i.e. by the coherence model? A ‘true’ statement is one that uses terms in a ‘correct’ way. ‘Correct’ would seem to mean something like ‘in accordance with the good’. By definition, ‘good’ is preferable to bad.
3) In response to your point about sense perception, Empiricus argues that different kinds of animals see things in different ways, different people see things in different ways, and therefore perception depends upon the condition and capacities of the subject. What is the basis for regarding our sense perceptions as preferable to other possible ones?
4) If we introduce God, then say that “God is not a deceiver”, that provides an answer, but seems to depend upon faith. Even within the faith tradition, though, there are passages which suggest the senses of humanity are deceptive (I am not saying they actually are), there are those passages in Christian, Buddhist and Muslim scriptures and saints which assert categorically that the world is a lie.
5) In response to the constructive dilemma, it would seem to make sense. The argument against belief would seem to emerge from belief (be it true or false). But the idea that truth is impossible is not asserted dogmatically. However, Empiricus suggests that the result of suspension of belief is “quietude”. Now, knowledge may either be true or false, and, by definition, it would seem that true knowledge is preferable. Yet in embracing what appears to be true knowledge, one embraces the risk of embracing false knowledge. Is false knowledge preferable to suspension of judgment? Perhaps it is.

Would the world be a more peaceful place if we refrained from assertions in the indicative, and instead adopted a perpetual subjunctive? It may be that, as long as humanity remains in the subjective, peace will prevail.

[Qoeleth]

Originally Posted by Charlemagne II

How is truth not possible?

Maybe you could define your term?

How do you define truth?

This seems to be a good point. Perhaps if there is no agree upon definition of truth, suspension of judgment on all matters may be preferable.

[Rainaldo]

The easiest way out of this is to posit that some truths are self-evident, true but unprovable, and that every other truth depends on them.

Only arguments can be circular, and definitions are not arguments. Definitions are a kind of statement of equality between two ways of looking at the same thing. (For example, a right-angled parallelogram is a rectangle, and a rectangle is a right-angled parallelogram. Rectangles and parallelograms are the same thing. That's not circularity, it's identity.)

[Rainaldo]

Originally Posted by Qoeleth

Would the world be a more peaceful place if we refrained from assertions in the indicative, and instead adopted a perpetual subjunctive? It may be that, as long as humanity remains in the subjective, peace will prevail.

Originally Posted by Qoeleth

This seems to be a good point. Perhaps if there is no agree upon definition of truth, suspension of judgment on all matters may be preferable.

No.

Evan Sayet said it best:

"What I discovered is that the Modern Liberal looks back on 50,000 years, 100,000 years of human civilization, and knows only one thing for sure: that none of the ideas that mankind has come up with--none of the religions, none of the philos*ophies, none of the ideologies, none of the forms of government--have succeeded in creating a world devoid of war, poverty, crime, and injustice. So they're convinced that since all of these ideas of man have proved to be wrong, the real cause of war, pov*erty, crime, and injustice must be found--can only be found--in the attempt to be right.

If nobody ever thought they were right, what would we disagree about? If we didn't disagree, surely we wouldn't fight. If we didn't fight, of course we wouldn't go to war. Without war, there would be no poverty; without poverty, there would be no crime; without crime, there would be no injustice. It's a utopian vision, and all that's required to usher in this utopia is the rejection of all fact, reason, evi*dence, logic, truth, morality, and decency--all the tools that you and I use in our attempts to be better people, to make the world more right by trying to be right, by siding with right, by recognizing what is right and moving toward it.


...


What you have is people who think that the best way to eliminate rational thought, the best way to eliminate the attempt to be right, is to work always to prove that right isn't right and to prove that wrong isn't wrong. You see this in John Lennon's song "Imagine": "Imagine there's no countries." Not imagine great countries, not imagine defeat the Nazis, but imagine no religions, and the key line is imagine a time when anything and everything that mankind values is devalued to the point where there's nothing left to kill or die for."

This suspension of judgment is what the serpent had in mind when he asked Eve, "Yea, hath God said?" - and you know what that led to.

[Godmachine]

I've met a lot of people who claim to know or possess the truth. I've never met anyone who actually does.

[tonyrey]

Originally Posted by Godmachine

I've met a lot of people who claim to know or possess the truth. I've never met anyone who actually does.

You are implicitly claiming that you actually know or possess the truth that no one you have ever met actually does know or possess the truth!

[Eric Hyom]

Can there be a greatest truth for God?

Could God love us as he loves himself?

Could God love us more than he loves himself?

Jesus said these commandments are greatest, can they be a greatest truth for God also?

just some thoughts,

Blessings,

Eric

[littlestsouls]

Truth exists necessarily; either it exists or it 'doesn't:
If truth does exist, it exists
If truth doesn't exist, it exists (because it must be true that it doesn't exist)

Truth cannot NOT be.

Regardless of whether or not we can substantiate a particular truth claim is irrelevant; truth exists independently of knowledge. We can arrive at particular truths through intuition, logic etc., which each presuppose an intrinsic rational order to things that can only be accepted by faith. Chesterton explains this point quite well.

[Qoeleth]

Originally Posted by littlestsouls

Truth exists necessarily; either it exists or it 'doesn't:
If truth does exist, it exists
If truth doesn't exist, it exists (because it must be true that it doesn't exist)

Truth cannot NOT be.

Regardless of whether or not we can substantiate a particular truth claim is irrelevant; truth exists independently of knowledge. We can arrive at particular truths through intuition, logic etc., which each presuppose an intrinsic rational order to things that can only be accepted by faith. Chesterton explains this point quite well.

Bravo! A good demonstration.
But is there something of the "This statement is false" paradox about the last line of the argument?