A closer look at the first way

[AndyT_81]

Friends - apologies in advance for the length of this OP. I wanted to cover off as many of the common objections and misunderstanding with regards to Aquinas' first way in the first post.

Change is a sure reality. What is change? Some would attempt to reduce change to local motion, i.e. the movement of this thing to that new position. However, it can be argued that this doesn’t capture all changes within the corporeal world. For instance, the transition to a higher energy state of an electron by an incident photon, or the change of the spin of a particle cannot meaningfully be said to be simply a matter of local motion. In addition, non-physicalists would not readily agree that changes in substances are fully reducible to local motion involving their constituent parts (though it would include such motion). Therefore, an understanding of change is needed that is more universal, and this can be found in the Aristotelian notions of potency and act. Local motion is possible because physical objects have the potential to change their position within space. This potential (or potency) is actualised by some other thing or component. A notion of potentiality is necessary to explain local motion in any case – what effects the local motion of certain objects is dependent on certain potentials within those objects. For instance, take the postulated Weakly Interacting Massive Particle (WIMP), if it exists, its local motion will be affected only by weak force and gravitational interactions – due to some property that is possesses, from which flows its potentiality for only those interactions. Therefore, it has the potential to interact with particles which have mass, but it does not have the potential to interact with other particles via the electromagnetic force. The possible causes which actualise these potencies are therefore limited. In the same way, other particle’s local motions are dependent on their nature, which contains certain potentialities with respect to possible interactions. With regards to the electron example – due to their essential nature, electrons have the potential to move into higher energy states via the absorption of a photon.

Therefore, all change can be described via this consideration of potency and act, and this is essentially what the sciences study whether individual scientists know it or not.

To move out of the sub-atomic realm and to more mundane and common examples, the acorn has within it the potential to become an oak tree – but this potential needs to be actualised by other factors external to the acorn itself (soil, water, correct temperature etc.), it cannot actualise that potency itself. For a potential to actualise itself, it would have to be potential and actual at the same time and in the same respect – which of course is absurd. Note however, that pure potentiality cannot actualise anything – the potential of a piece of wood to combust will not in itself cause another piece of wood to combust. Therefore, the first way can be phrased as such (reverting to “change” instead of the unwieldy but more precise “reduction of potency to act”):

1) Change occurs
2) Nothing can change itself
3) Whatever causes change must itself be either changing or be an unchanged changer
4) An infinite series of changers is impossible
5) Therefore there must exist an unchanged changer (a being of pure actuality)

I think 1-3 are fairly un-controversial, for to deny these would amount to denying any intelligibility to causality. Number 4 however needs further explanation. Aquinas identified two types of causal series, one accidently ordered (per accidens) and the other essentially ordered (per se). An accidently ordered series is a temporal series, whereby each element within the series has independent causal powers. Consider – Abraham begets Isaac, Isaac begets Jacob and Jacob begets Joseph. The ability of Jacob to beget Joseph does not depend on the concurrent begetting of Isaac by Abraham – Abraham being dead and not currently begetting anyone does not hinder Jacob’s independent causal power to reproduce. The same with a gun firing a bullet at a target – after the bullet has been fired, the bullet will continue to travel towards and hit the target irrespective of whether the gun is still in existence or not. Aquinas believed that per accidens series could theoretically and coherently proceed to infinity.

An essentially ordered series is different, and it is a series of this sort that (4) depends on. The elements in this type of series do not have independent causal power, rather their causal power depends entirely on the “previous” (whereby I am using previous to express ontological, not temporal, order) member in the series – for this reason there must be a first member in the series from which all the members derive their causal power. The archetypical example of this type of series is a hand using a stick to push a rock. The continuous movement of the rock is dependent on the continuous movement of the stick, which in turn is dependent on the continuous movement of the hand – as such the hand actualises the potency of the rock for spatial movement in the presence of friction, and the stick is purely instrumental in this series. If the hand vanished, the rock would no longer be continuously moving because the stick would lose its causal power to actualise that potential. Of course, the series does not end there – the hand is kept in motion by the movement of muscles, which are in turn activated by certain motor neurons, which are in turn being activated by other neurons, whereby the neurons are being “fired” via the action of ions and other chemical compounds, which in turn operate due to their molecular structure, caused by atomic properties and actions, then sub-atomic properties and action and on and on. If any of these elements ceased to be, the rock would no longer be in continuous movement.

cont..

[AndyT_81]

We can also think about this example another way – in order for the muscles, say, to operate as muscles at all, their potential (and existence) must depend on another per se causal series. For instance, the muscles operate (or exist) as muscles because of their large scale cellular structure and then, in short hand: cell properties – molecular properties – atomic properties – sub-atomic properties - ….? The potentials of the level of matter in each of these elements is actualised by the potentials of the matter in the lower level i.e. the potential of muscular cells to contribute to (actualise) the actions of a muscle are in turn actualised by the potentials of the molecular machinery of those cells and so on down the chain – therefore we have a per se ordered series. If any of these elements ceased to exist within the muscle, the muscle would no longer exist let alone have any potential to move. This is how the first way is closely related to the second way (some might say it is essentially the same argument).

These series must have a first member, because these series are essentially ordered and therefore cannot be infinitely long. If you doubt this, consider whether a car can be pulled via a chain without any “puller” at the other end. It certainly cannot, even if the chain is infinitely long. It is like saying that a paint brush can paint a picture, without a painter, just by virtue of the handle of the brush being infinitely long. The only candidate for this first mover or changer is a being which is purely actual, with no potentiality whatsoever and therefore this first mover/changer must be itself unmoved/unchanged. If this being had any potentiality whatsoever, it could not be the terminus of the series. Finally other arguments can show that this being of pure act is also eternal, unlimited in any way, immaterial, all powerful and perfect.

Therefore this being is what we call God.

[Candide West]

Originally Posted by AndyT_81

We can also think about this example another way – in order for the muscles, say, to operate as muscles at all, their potential (and existence) must depend on another per se causal series. For instance, the muscles operate (or exist) as muscles because of their large scale cellular structure and then, in short hand: cell properties – molecular properties – atomic properties – sub-atomic properties - ….? The potentials of the level of matter in each of these elements is actualised by the potentials of the matter in the lower level i.e. the potential of muscular cells to contribute to (actualise) the actions of a muscle are in turn actualised by the potentials of the molecular machinery of those cells and so on down the chain – therefore we have a per se ordered series. If any of these elements ceased to exist within the muscle, the muscle would no longer exist let alone have any potential to move. This is how the first way is closely related to the second way (some might say it is essentially the same argument).

These series must have a first member, because these series are essentially ordered and therefore cannot be infinitely long. If you doubt this, consider whether a car can be pulled via a chain without any “puller” at the other end. It certainly cannot, even if the chain is infinitely long. It is like saying that a paint brush can paint a picture, without a painter, just by virtue of the handle of the brush being infinitely long. The only candidate for this first mover or changer is a being which is purely actual, with no potentiality whatsoever and therefore this first mover/changer must be itself unmoved/unchanged. If this being had any potentiality whatsoever, it could not be the terminus of the series. Finally other arguments can show that this being of pure act is also eternal, unlimited in any way, immaterial, all powerful and perfect.

Therefore this being is what we call God.

Ok, I've been through this argument recently but lets see where this goes.

The problem I have always had with this argument is that it skips over the real meat of the question and jumps directly to "this being is what we call God". The same sudden massive leap that Aquinas made. Now I'm happy to accept for the sake of argument that there was a prime mover (which I'll refer to as PM for short). This PM is a "something" which happened first.

My question to you is whether you can fill in that gap and give the PM some of the qualities usually associated with the Christian God, instead of just saying "lets just call it God". Lets start off with "personal being" how do you show that PM is really a personal being?

[ReapReason]

Originally Posted by Candide West

Ok, I've been through this argument recently but lets see where this goes.

The problem I have always had with this argument is that it skips over the real meat of the question and jumps directly to "this being is what we call God". The same sudden massive leap that Aquinas made. Now I'm happy to accept for the sake of argument that there was a prime mover (which I'll refer to as PM for short). This PM is a "something" which happened first.

My question to you is whether you can fill in that gap and give the PM some of the qualities usually associated with the Christian God, instead of just saying "lets just call it God". Lets start off with "personal being" how do you show that PM is really a personal being?

Would you agree that an object which has knowlege of an object is greater than an object that has no knowledge?

[TS Aquinas]

Originally Posted by Candide West

The problem I have always had with this argument is that it skips over the real meat of the question and jumps directly to "this being is what we call God". The same sudden massive leap that Aquinas made. Now I'm happy to accept for the sake of argument that there was a prime mover (which I'll refer to as PM for short). This PM is a "something" which happened first.

My question to you is whether you can fill in that gap and give the PM some of the qualities usually associated with the Christian God, instead of just saying "lets just call it God". Lets start off with "personal being" how do you show that PM is really a personal being?

When he wrote down the five ways, he designed them to be a systematic approach to the overall conclusion. Also, he was expecting the student to see the argument as a whole rather then in parts. If we examine the first way by itself, the prime mover could be a number of things but going through the rest and ending with the fifth way, the conclusion is God. If we were to ignore the fourth and fifth way (henological and teleological arguments) and only accept the first three ways (the cosmological arguments), then one can suppose a number of things. If you're asking if the PM is personal by way of constantly interacting with what is moved then yes, third way demonstrates this. If you're asking if the PM is personal by way of wanting relationship then yes, fifth way (could use the fourth way too) demonstrates this.

[Charlemagne II]

At the very least, the Prime Mover, if it is to be regarded as a Person, must have will and intellect.

That the universe did not exist and came to exist suggests very strongly that the Prime Mover willed it, or it would not have come to exist.

That the universe not only came to exist, but is also dominated by laws that have produced not only order, but also minds (our own) capable of discerning the existence of that order, suggests intellect in the Prime Mover.

“This most beautiful system [the universe] could only proceed from the dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Isaac Newton

That the Prime Mover might want to have a personal relationship with his creatures is suggested by the fact that he wanted to create them in the first place. If he doesn't want personal relationships, he would not bother to make creatures who also want a personal relationship with him.

[AndyT_81]

Hi Candide West,

Thanks for the comments - what you ask is pretty much another thread on its own, but I'm happy to go that way if you like. Others have already given some good ideas, I will suppose a few more.

With regards to Aquinas skipping to the conclusion, you need to remember that he does this in the context of a summary of his works in the Summa - he develops the typical attributes of God as flowing from the Being of Pure Act in other places (both elsewhere in the Summa and in other works).

One thing we know about a Being of Pure Act is that it is immaterial. For starters, we know that, because it created and sustains the material universe in existence, it must transcend matter in some way. Second, the Being of Pure Act cannot be material because all material things are compounds of act and potency - think about it, all matter is in some sense malleable and therefore capable of change/actualisation.

Another thing we know is that the Being is eternal. Time is a measure of change, and a Being of Pure Act is incapable of change.

Another thing we know about a Being of Pure Actuality is that there can be only one of them. If there were more beings, there would have to be a way of distinguishing them. Because that would involve some of these beings lacking attributes that the others have, they could not be purely actual - because there is some potential/deficiency in those beings. Therefore the idea of multiple beings of Pure Act is incoherent.

The more actual a thing is, the greater is its power. For instance, an adult human being has greater intellectual power than a baby, because the intellectual potential of a human being has been actualised to a greater extent in an adult than in a baby. Further a Being of Pure Act cannot be limited in any way, because this would mean that it has some potential which is not fulfilled. Therefore, a Being of Pure Act would be infinitely powerful.

We could go further - others have said that from the fifth way we can determine that the being of Pure Act has an intellect. We can also arrive at this conclusion, and others, by reasoning from the world to the Being of Pure Act through the principle of proportionate causality. That will probably do for now though.

What do you think?

[JDaniel]

Originally Posted by Candide West

Ok, I've been through this argument recently but lets see where this goes.

The problem I have always had with this argument is that it skips over the real meat of the question and jumps directly to "this being is what we call God". The same sudden massive leap that Aquinas made. Now I'm happy to accept for the sake of argument that there was a prime mover (which I'll refer to as PM for short). This PM is a "something" which happened first.

Candide:

I see flaws in your re-statement of Aquinas, which result in errors in your conclusions:

1) Referring to the Prime Mover as “God” is not a “massive leap.” I doubt that it is in anyone’s opinion, but, it is, at least, something to say, in the absence of something stronger to say. If you actually think that it is a massive leap, then I would ask “why?” We are wont, as humans, to create grunts that often become pointers to something, are we not? We call these grunts, "words," do we not?

2) Either the prime (i.e., first) mover is “first,” or it is not the Prime (i.e., First) Mover, but rather, a secondary - and subordinated - mover located somewhere down the line along some chain of essentially subordinated movers. A “something which 'happened first'” is a serious misapprehension of what is understood as “Prime Mover.” That which merely “happened first” suggests that there is still something further back that caused that “happening.” If there is, then we’ve not gone back far enough. And, if you say, “Well, we’ll simply have to keep going back, then,” that portends the infamous “infinite” chain of movers – which we’ve just now agreed there cannot be. You see, God did not “just happen.” God is and always was; He’s not a first "happening." Nor can God be subordinated.

My question to you is whether you can fill in that gap and give the PM some of the qualities usually associated with the Christian God, instead of just saying "lets just call it God".

And that is another and separate argument. It is an argument that St. Thomas spends lots of paper and ink on.

In my opinion, that He is our "personal God" stands to reason: we are not only subordinated movers, we are also the "moved."

Lets start off with "personal being" how do you show that PM is really a personal being?

I’m not sure what you are implying by the juxtaposition of those two words. What do those two words mean to you, when strung together? In the example given by the OP, of the hand moving the stick, moving the stone along the ground, that hand is a "personal mover" to that stone. But, since that rock is not essentially subordinated to it, the hand can go away without hampering any future occurrence of that rock moving. A rock might just have several "personal movers" in its lifetime. They may move the stone, but, they did not move that stone into existence. It was moved into existence by its molecules, which were moved into existence by their atoms, which were moved into existence by their point particles (protons, neutrons, and electrons), which were moved into existence by their underlying quantum things (fermions and bosons), which were moved into existence by configurations of space determined by algorithms, which were brought about by a thinking, non-subordinated Being of extraordinary capabilities, who brings things into existence solely by his thought and will. We are all thoughts of God, all of our pains and deficiencies notwithstanding.

God bless,
jd

[Charlemagne II]

As to whether reason can help us find a personal God in this Prime Mover, William Paley's Evidences of Christianity and also his book Natural Theology go a long way in that direction. It is fashionable in certain quarters to dismiss his way of thinking, but I have never understood why. Perhaps the argument of Richard Dawkins' et. al., that evolution has made atheism inevitable, is behind much of that resistance to Aquinas and Paley and the more philosophical approach to God through the Prime Mover.

[Candide West]

Originally Posted by ReapReason

Would you agree that an object which has knowlege of an object is greater than an object that has no knowledge?

No idea what you mean. Greater in what way? Greater to who, or to what?

[Candide West]

Originally Posted by TS Aquinas

When he wrote down the five ways, he designed them to be a systematic approach to the overall conclusion. Also, he was expecting the student to see the argument as a whole rather then in parts. If we examine the first way by itself, the prime mover could be a number of things but going through the rest and ending with the fifth way, the conclusion is God. If we were to ignore the fourth and fifth way (henological and teleological arguments) and only accept the first three ways (the cosmological arguments), then one can suppose a number of things. If you're asking if the PM is personal by way of constantly interacting with what is moved then yes, third way demonstrates this. If you're asking if the PM is personal by way of wanting relationship then yes, fifth way (could use the fourth way too) demonstrates this.

Ok, please demonstrate. Show me how you get from our current point of "one or more prime movers existed" to "The prime mover was a personal being".

(incidentally by personal being I mean something sentient, something that is aware that it is.)

[Candide West]

Originally Posted by Charlemagne II

At the very least, the Prime Mover, if it is to be regarded as a Person, must have will and intellect.

Now that IF in the above is the point I'm questioning here. At the moment I've never seen a linking argument to get from "a prime mover or movers existed" to "it should be regarded as a person".

[Candide West]

Originally Posted by AndyT_81

Hi Candide West,

Thanks for the comments - what you ask is pretty much another thread on its own, but I'm happy to go that way if you like. Others have already given some good ideas, I will suppose a few more.

With regards to Aquinas skipping to the conclusion, you need to remember that he does this in the context of a summary of his works in the Summa - he develops the typical attributes of God as flowing from the Being of Pure Act in other places (both elsewhere in the Summa and in other works).

One thing we know about a Being of Pure Act is that it is immaterial. For starters, we know that, because it created and sustains the material universe in existence, it must transcend matter in some way. Second, the Being of Pure Act cannot be material because all material things are compounds of act and potency - think about it, all matter is in some sense malleable and therefore capable of change/actualisation.

Another thing we know is that the Being is eternal. Time is a measure of change, and a Being of Pure Act is incapable of change.

Another thing we know about a Being of Pure Actuality is that there can be only one of them. If there were more beings, there would have to be a way of distinguishing them. Because that would involve some of these beings lacking attributes that the others have, they could not be purely actual - because there is some potential/deficiency in those beings. Therefore the idea of multiple beings of Pure Act is incoherent.

The more actual a thing is, the greater is its power. For instance, an adult human being has greater intellectual power than a baby, because the intellectual potential of a human being has been actualised to a greater extent in an adult than in a baby. Further a Being of Pure Act cannot be limited in any way, because this would mean that it has some potential which is not fulfilled. Therefore, a Being of Pure Act would be infinitely powerful.

We could go further - others have said that from the fifth way we can determine that the being of Pure Act has an intellect. We can also arrive at this conclusion, and others, by reasoning from the world to the Being of Pure Act through the principle of proportionate causality. That will probably do for now though.

What do you think?

Hey,

I'm not quite sure what to make of this to be honest, you seem to be writing this to me, but it doesn't seem to be in reply to anything I wrote. My question was with regards to making the link from the existence of a Prime Mover (PM) over to the PM having personal being. In other words it being something that might call itself "I".

The arguments you've presented above contain a lot of inherent assumptions which could be challenged in their own right. But none seem to have anything to do with the question I asked so it seems better to set that aside for now.

[Candide West]

Originally Posted by JDaniel

Candide:

I see flaws in your re-statement of Aquinas, which result in errors in your conclusions:

I don't think I've made a re-statement of Aquinas. All I've done is asked a common question regarding the last line of the "first way".*

1) Referring to the Prime Mover as “God” is not a “massive leap.” I doubt that it is in anyone’s opinion, but, it is, at least, something to say, in the absence of something stronger to say. If you actually think that it is a massive leap, then I would ask “why?”*

Because the word "God" has vast piles of connotations (often different ones to different people) if the word God had only one meaning and that meaning was "whatever it was that happened first" then I would of course not object. Unfortunately however the word "God" does have all those extra connotations, so it is obviously much clearer to miss off the last line of Aquinas's proof and simply say that a Prime Mover (PM) existed. That is the point which Aquinas has essentially taken the argument to. I'm happy to work from there.

We are wont, as humans, to create grunts that often become pointers to something, are we not? We call these grunts, "words," do we not?

Indeed, and I think PM is a useful term for what Aquinas's first way demonstrates to exist. I'm curious to see if anyone here can take the argument any further than that.*

2) Either the prime (i.e., first) mover is “first,” or it is not the Prime (i.e., First) Mover, but rather, a secondary - and subordinated - mover located somewhere down the line along some chain of essentially subordinated movers. A “something which 'happened first'” is a serious misapprehension of what is understood as “Prime Mover.” That which merely “happened first” suggests that there is still something further back that caused that “happening.” If there is, then we’ve not gone back far enough. And, if you say, “Well, we’ll simply have to keep going back, then,” that portends the infamous “infinite” chain of movers – which we’ve just now agreed there cannot be. You see, God did not “just happen.” God is and always was; He’s not a first "happening." Nor can God be subordinated.

Ok, I'm ok with all that except for you having inserted "God" into this again. The last part of your paragraph should have been*

"You see, PM did not “just happen.” PM is and always was; it is not a first "happening." Nor can PM be subordinated."

Otherwise I agree with you, by definition the PM is whatever happened first, that's the starting point here. I'm entirely happy with that.*

And that is another and separate argument. It is an argument that St. Thomas spends lots of paper and ink on.

In my opinion, that He is our "personal God" stands to reason: we are not only subordinated movers, we are also the "moved."

Ok, so you agree with me then that all the "first way" shows is "something happened first". I have no issue with that conclusion.

I’m not sure what you are implying by the juxtaposition of those two words. What do those two words mean to you, when strung together? In the example given by the OP, of the hand moving the stick, moving the stone along the ground, that hand is a "personal mover" to that stone. But, since that rock is not essentially subordinated to it, the hand can go away without hampering any future occurrence of that rock moving. A rock might just have several "personal movers" in its lifetime. They may move the stone, but, they did not move that stone into existence. It was moved into existence by its molecules, which were moved into existence by their atoms, which were moved into existence by their point particles (protons, neutrons, and electrons), which were moved into existence by their underlying quantum things (fermions and bosons), which were moved into existence by configurations of space determined by algorithms, which were brought about by a thinking, non-subordinated Being of extraordinary capabilities, who brings things into existence solely by his thought and will. We are all thoughts of God, all of our pains and deficiencies notwithstanding.

By "personal being" I mean an entity that might refer to itself as "I" something that knows that it exists.*

[Charlemagne II]

Candide

Now that IF in the above is the point I'm questioning here. At the moment I've never seen a linking argument to get from "a prime mover or movers existed" to "it should be regarded as a person".

The link was suggested in post #6. Isaac Newton also saw the link.