Philosophy of Mind: Does materialism entail hard determinism?

[GEddie]

Originally Posted by Taestron

There is a concept in philosophy called supervenience with which some have tried to reconcile materialism and free will. The theory goes something like this: Human beings are sufficiently complex enough to have a second order of thoughts (the level of abstraction and self-reflection). It can be demonstrated that these higher level thoughts can affect ("supervene") on the lower processes. You can rationalize something and your anger subsides or you think positively and your body releases more potent disease fighting cells. This complexity has some materialistic philosophers thinking they have avoided determinism.

However, there is one problem with this view. If all that exists is physical, then your mind is merely responding to physical stimulae, no matter how complex the process. Your mind, will, higher emotions... if these only exist because of physical processes, then the higher order of thoughts still is determined by material stimulae. And thus the theory doesn't avoid determinism.

Why couldn't there be a self-directing process that is physical in nature?

Why is this such a discomforting issue? Is it just that if "will" is not fully free, we might have to adapt some of our other cherished abstractions?

ICXC NIKA

[Taestron]

Originally Posted by GEddie

Why couldn't there be a self-directing process that is physical in nature?

I cannot think of what a wholly physical, free, self-directing process would be. If materialism is true, then physical stimuli are like Boolean operators and our intelligence is like logic. No matter how complex the thought process is, it is still dependent on the input. A self-directing and free process would need one of two abilities: 1) The ability to generate thought apart from physical stimuli and 2) the ability to direct the process against the outcome of logic. I cannot think of a way that either of these happen without something akin to the soul.

For analogy, take artificial intelligence. Sure we can create complex programs that mimic the physical thought process of humans and possibly imitate being self-directing., but we could not get it to operate without physical stimuli (fails 1) or go against the outcome of the program (fails 2). This means that artificial intelligence, no matter how advanced, cannot be called a self-directing.

[TS Aquinas]

Originally Posted by Taestron

I cannot think of what a wholly physical, free, self-directing process would be. If materialism is true, then physical stimuli are like Boolean operators and our intelligence is like logic. No matter how complex the thought process is, it is still dependent on the input. A self-directing and free process would need one of two abilities: 1) The ability to generate thought apart from physical stimuli and 2) the ability to direct the process against the outcome of logic. I cannot think of a way that either of these happen without something akin to the soul.

For analogy, take artificial intelligence. Sure we can create complex programs that mimic the physical thought process of humans and possibly imitate being self-directing., but we could not get it to operate without physical stimuli (fails 1) or go against the outcome of the program (fails 2). This means that artificial intelligence, no matter how advanced, cannot be called a self-directing.

It should follow then if higher order functions are material and determined, then the logic to whatever input should be a repeatable output for every person. By common experience, this is not the case. Ergo, either materialism has to avoid determinism by necessity, which it can't, or materialism is false. This also includes property dualism since it advocates higher order functions emerge from material properties, to mental properties and revert back to material properties.

[Qoeleth]

I do not see how it could not but lead to hard determinism. Clearly, if there is nothing in the 'system' but matter, then things must progress according to pre-existing causes.

Unless, of course, causality was rejected. But to attempt to reject causality would be far-fetched.