I am not clear that it disproves the IP video, although it does claim to.
Regarding the idea reinforced by deGrasse Tyson that it is the interaction at the quantum level rather than the agent or free will of the agent that brings about indeterminacy, IP has several videos to answer that, including this one.
The point being that the indeterminacy with regard to observer interactions with the world may be agent dependent rather than interaction dependent, so it would still not rule out free will. I would suppose that the problem then becomes to prove that the indeterminacy is completely or potentially completely agent dependent. iP addresses that point in the video above.
The more important objection, though, is the one brought up at the end of the rebuttal video in your post, having to do with the predictability of actions. The claim is that by monitoring physiological interactions in the brain, the person’s choices can be predicted BEFORE the person makes them. That is supposedly a “slam dunk” rebuttal of free will since the choice comes after the physical activity in the brain, thus choices have dependency on physical causal events and cannot be free.
Notice the claim is that choices are predicted in the experiment “with reasonable accuracy.” That doesn’t imply they are always predictable, which leads to the question of why they weren’t in those less frequent cases. How are those to be explained? It could be that the monitoring was incomplete and some brain functions were missed, but until that question is dealt with, it cannot just be assumed to be what happened.
I recently listened to or read Edward Feser on the subject. I’ll have to find it, but he points out that even if the external indicator of choice (reaction) follows the neurochemical activity, that doesn’t prove the choice was dependent upon it. The final choice may still be agent-dependent, but the agent was taking into account the physiological factors BEFORE making the final choice.
Thus, even if the agent chose according to those physiological factors, it doesn’t mean the agent could not have chosen otherwise, just all things considered the physiological output matched the option chosen. For example, using a spreadsheet as a tool to provide answers to important questions does not mean the spreadsheet causes our behaviour (deciding based upon the output) as an inevitable outcome of all the inputs into the spreadsheet. We take the functional outputs of the spreadsheet into account and those become grounds for our choices and behaviours that derive from them. Even if it was found that the choices of spreadsheet users always or almost always align with the results of the calculations, it doesn’t follow that the functions of spreadsheets cause human behaviour.