Thank you this does help clarify things. I think the fact that you brought rationality into the equation is crucial. I should have amended our earlier definition of morality because I think the one I offered was a bit too general. Morality only applies to rational ends for rational creatures, do you agree with that?
The strange thing is that I think I can mostly agree with what you have written above, depending on how rationality is to be interpreted and what role it plays. To me rationality suggests consideration of something that has a degree of universality about it, where as feelings do not have any universality. You said that emotions are like an engine pushing us forward and rationality gives us proper direction. This I think is accurate. But then at the end you say that “everything we do is because of feelings.” Do you mean to say the goal of morality is acquisition of feelings?
If so, in your first post you asked us to assume that God can justify objective morality, but then argued that if we suppose this then any human being can justify objective morality. Since you said that feelings are the end of human morality (feelings being interpreted more generally as a “particular end” rather than a universal end), presumably these particular feelings are what would justify morality. And the assumption in the first post seems to be that God and humans justify morality in the same way, so then it would follow that God’s ends also consist in particular things. Does that explain your thinking?
But this is the wrong way to think about God’s willing. God properly speaking only wills His own goodness as an end, which is universal and transcends particularities. Particular goods are effects of this willing of His own goodness as His end, He does not will particular things as ends in themselves. If God does will particular goodnesses as ends in themselves, then I can see why you are having this difficulty. However, it is this universal goodness that would justify objective morality.