[quote="davidv, post:4, topic:292953"]
Why do you think moral choices have quantitative value?
What quantitative value would you give to the active of giving your brother a hug when they were feeling down?
I don't believe most think of their choices in this way.
Neither. Moral choices cannot be reduce to math problems.
Since God is perfect, and he made this world, how could he have made a better one?
Unsound conclusion, based on a faulty premise.
What is midway between non-quantitave values?
Most people make choices based on what they think is best. Many select a counterfeit best instead of the true best.
(1) giving one's brother a hug has quantitative value (in some sense, since quantity is transcendental too) because it is "better" than not hugging -it has more (quantity) of some quality (good). So since diverse things that are comparable, are so only in virtue of some common measure, I am asking what is the common measure which we call "good" and allows us to consider one good to be more or less good?
(2) From the first point, the answer to this objection can be seen.
(3) Idk. I suppose that this is the best world from the point of view of God's values and the subjective pov of God's choice, even though (from the objective pov of the actual worlds) there are better worlds considered w/o regard to values. To illustrate, a man may say that his decision to buy a burger is best because he is hungry and it fulfills his most urgent desire but that doesn't mean that there wasn't a better thing that he could've chosen (steak or what-have-you).
(4) passions are based on the bodily organs and anything physical is quantitative. The doctrine of the mean is the idea that these passions must be reduced to a mean of sensation in order for them to be in accord with reason. Now this must mean, that the right choice is the one which is a midpoint or some such between two passions. But if that was true then virtue would not be possible for people whose organs are decrepit (like retarded people). But we know that retarded people are capable of virtue sometimes.
So then, perhaps they are virtuous in one way but not in another (after all, not every passion is out-of-order for all of these people)?
(5) They don't know what is best because perhaps they don't know how to measure goodness; they don't know the standard of goodness.