Interesting paper/book


#1

I got this link off of a comment on Jill Stanek's blog. I'm 1/4 through it, wondering what everyone thinks about it:

sneps.net/RD/uploads/1-Shall%20the%20Religious%20Inherit%20the%20Earth.pdf


#2

[quote="gmarie21, post:1, topic:195499"]
I got this link off of a comment on Jill Stanek's blog. I'm 1/4 through it, wondering what everyone thinks about it:

sneps.net/RD/uploads/1-Shall%20the%20Religious%20Inherit%20the%20Earth.pdf

[/quote]

You'll get more responses if you summarize the key ideas of the book. It's very unlikely that people are going to read it.


#3

[quote="flyingfish, post:2, topic:195499"]
You'll get more responses if you summarize the key ideas of the book. It's very unlikely that people are going to read it.

[/quote]

It basically talks about how those who are solid in their faith and non-secular are the wave of the future due to the fact that our fertility rates are higher and our children aren't going to the secular side.


#4

The United States is no exception to the trend of demographic radicalization. This
has accentuated as ethnic and confessional differences faded in the late twentieth century,
bringing religion to the fore as a political issue. As American society became more
ethnically porous in the 1970s, alliances were forged across Protestant, Catholic and
Jewish lines by moral traditionalists. This alliance was subsequently drawn into politics
in the 1980s as the newly-coined ‘Moral Majority’ by three conservative activists, Richard
Viguerie, Paul Weyrich and Howard Phillips. Fittingly, the first two were Catholics, the
third a Jew, and their chosen figurehead was the late Jerry Falwell, an evangelical
Protestant. (Bruce 1998: 148-9) The new ferment prompted Robert Wuthnow to remark
that ‘the major divisions in American religion now revolve around an axis of liberalism
and conservatism rather than the denominational landmarks of the past’ (Wuthnow 1989:
178). The term ‘culture wars’ emerged on the back of these changes, reflecting not only
socio-religious changes, but the opening up of a new political axis based on religious and
moral traditionalism, which crosses ethnic and denominational lines. (Hunter 1991;
Fiorina, Abrams et al. 2005)


#5

and

In the United States, white Catholics no longer have higher fertility than white
Protestants, but women with conservative beliefs on abortion (whether Catholic,
Protestant or Jewish) bear nearly two-thirds of a child more than those with pro-choice
views. (Kaufmann, Goujon et al. forthcoming) Conservative denominations also have
higher fertility than more liberal ones, not to mention seculars. (Skirbekk, Goujon et al.
forthcoming) American research also suggests a significant link between various
measures of religiosity (congregational participation, denominationational conservatism,
attendance) and fertility. Participation in congregational groups is especially important.
(Hackett 2008) During much of the twentieth century, women in conservative Protestant
denominations bore almost a child more than their counterparts in more liberal Protestant
denominations. This was the main reason why conservative Protestants increased their
share of the white Protestant population from roughly a third among those born in 1900
to nearly two-thirds of those born in 1975. (Hout, Greeley et al. 2001) Individual-level
relationships are reproduced through compositional effects at the state level, hence higher
white fertility in states with large Mormon or evangelical Protestant populations. Indeed,
there was a correlation of .78 between a state’s white fertility rate and its 2004 vote for
George W. Bush, an effect strongly mediated by religious traditionalism. (Hout, Greeley
and Wilde 2001; (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). After all, 78 percent of white
evangelicals voted for Bush in 2004 (including a majority of Hispanic Protestants), as did
solid majorities of theologically traditionalist Catholics and mainline Protestants.
Seculars and theologically modernist Christians of all denominations, by contrast,
overwhelmingly backed John Kerry. The 2008 election shows only a modest change in
this pattern. (Guth, Kellstedt et al. 2005) (Guth 2008)


#6

[quote="gmarie21, post:3, topic:195499"]
It basically talks about how those who are solid in their faith and non-secular are the wave of the future due to the fact that our fertility rates are higher and our children aren't going to the secular side.

[/quote]

Is there evidence that this is happening? Effective birth control has been around for a while, but it seem society is becoming more and more secular.


#7

I’m reading it. Almost halfway through.

That’s right - some people are becoming more secular, and are having less children. The argument is that those not buying into the secularization are having more children, are teaching them likewise, and therefore will become the majority.

It does help to read the article.


#8

I understand the argument, I’m asking if the book provides evidence. Birth control has been around for a long time now, so this effect should be already showing, no? Or is it only recently that secular folk have started having smaller families than religious folk?


#9

From what I have read, it seems the author believes it will take more time.


#10

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