That would not make any difference, in the RC assessment and judgement.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, like all the cities on the target list, were conventional military targets, though not conventionally targeted. But while that was quite true, the destruction of that military capacity in itself was not the anticipated cause of the post-haste Japanese surrender. Such destruction of military capacity/urban infrastructure/civilian deaths had taken place in many other places in the Home Islands (most noticeably in the raids on the six major cities between March and July 1945) and could have been done in these two cases with multiple B-29 raids on those two cities, and the Japanese still would not have been prepared to surrender. Rather, it was the shock of the destruction realized from a single B-San/single bomb that was counted on to end the war. That is, it was not the destruction of that military capacity (or deaths) in itself that was the primary goal of the bombing, it was the breaking of the Japanese will to continue the fighting, by doing so with such economy of effort: one plane/ one bomb/one day. It was, indeed, the resolve of the Japanese power structure, specifically the resolve of the only power structure capable of ending the war, the badly divided Saiko Senso Shido Kaigo, (plus the Emperor and one or two other power brokers such as the Marquis Kido, Keeper of the Privy Seal).
The history of the endgame in the Pacific is immensely complicated, and a hobby of mine for over 25 years. I often find myself drawing on that hobby, when this general subject appears and drifts into this area. I always hope it doesn’t. I’ve posted more than enough on it.