… once again this came up:
"Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him god?"
i think i’m going to try to apply the principle of double effect on the action of giving us free will, exercised by good or bad choices and the necessary by-product of sin. however, i’m having a hard time trying to have the third term of the doctrine hold water. maybe i’m just reading it wrong:
3) The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words, the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise, the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.
does the argument work? why? how? heelp!
edit: nevermind. i see it in the second to last sentence now. i’ll go for it. wish me luck! and discuss my theory and other possible ways to debunk the claim that a god able but not ‘willing’ to fix evil is malicious.