[quote="TS_Aquinas, post:1, topic:285810"]
As the title says, does materialism/physicalism/naturalism entail hard determinism?
Hmmm. So the very subject and substance of logic itself would actually have to be material then. . . Or would it?
I somehow feel compelled to answer nevertheless: Perhaps. But, I guess, not necessarily, pending thorough empirical research into the physics behind logical inference.
I mean, OK, sure, determinism probably does follow. However, that's only if the Principle of Sufficient Reason is really a legitimate one; that is, y'know, if the world is in fact intelligible instead of, on the contrary, one (well, vaguely one-ish, at least) giant, chaotic mess of random happenstance and disorderly nonsense and stuff -- yes, even well after the fantastic discoveries about the physical world at the sub-atomic level of quantum theory have been invoked in all their counter-intuitive, entirely-material glory.
If the latter, we'd as a result have absolutely no way of having any idea about the matter at all, as indeed the intelligibility of that which is intelligible would have to be immaterial itself, along with the possibility of the immaterial intellect that it would thus necessarily demand. And of course the truth of that matter just wouldn't really exist as any topic for discussion whatsoever, like it presumably does now, certainly not "in fact" or any such ridiculous thing.
Ahhh, see, I'm now beginning to lose a sufficient conceptual grasp of the concrete meaning and objective significance underlying the matter we're supposed to be discussing in this thread (and I suspect you may be too). With this in mind, I'm inclined to wonder: maybe that's the only effect I should ever ultimately expect with any sort of confidence whenever I find myself trying to determine the abstract implications of theoretical materialism.