I’ll grant you that (the confusion part). The best description I’ve seen on this topic is in Veritatis Splendor.
78. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the “object” rationally chosen by the deliberate will… In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.
A single act has a single object: it is the nature of the act. It is the proximate end, of which I believe there is only one. (There can only be one…)
Yes, I think this is the crux of our disagreement. Read Veritatis Splendor from section 76 and see what you make of it.