C’mon, I have several times agreed with, acknowledged, and cited documents that all plainly state that a good intention cannot justify an action with an intrinsically evil object. Let’s put this one to bed. That’s what it means that some acts are intrinsically evil.
The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God (Veritatis Splendor)
The bomber’s intention is only to >destroy the factory<, and the only act that >destroys the factory< is the one that is (also) inherently, by its very nature, ordered to the death of an innocent.
The mother’s intention is only to >restore her health<, and the only act that >restores her health< is the one that is (also) inherently, by its very nature, ordered to the death of an innocent.
In all three cases the same act that brings life to some brings death to others. The one thing we know, however, is that at least two of those acts are morally justifiable. I’ve seen nothing to differentiate the bystander’s act from the mother’s and the bomber’s.
Describe the object of this act. JPII defines the object this way:
“that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision.”
So, what is the proximate end of the act of throwing the switch? As I see it it is to divert the trolley away from the five. There is no conceivable way to define the object - an end - as directing the trolley at the one. That is surely a consequence of the act, but it is no kind of end, let alone the proximate one. The object is not intrinsically evil because the proximate end that defines it is moral.