In one sense, it’s much more banal than interesting. With regard to religious revelation, this would fall under the more general source for knowledge that we call “testimony.” Epistemologists have enjoyed something of a renaissance of this division of knowing in recent years. The first such text I came across was CAJ Coady’s Testimony: a Philosophical Study. Robert Audi and others later incorporated testimony itself into their general texts on epistemology as being a stand-alone source and ground of knowledge (along with perception, introspection, reason, etc). That is to say, all humans everywhere for all time have held, what you might call, testimonially-grounded beliefs. When a person stops to consider the widespread nature of testimony, it quickly becomes evident that it is a placeholder for the majority of our beliefs (or at least of the beliefs that we would consider important).
From history to foreign affairs to local news to science to religion to medicine to what your spouse did at work that day—all of this knowledge comes to you via testimony. Someone who is presumably in a position to know, tells you so.
So beliefs that are sourced and justified by testimony are commonplace. What might be interesting is the question of trust/justification. When you ask yourself whether person X is in a proper position to know that Y (Y being the thing that person X just told you). That’s an interesting question. But normally, our standards for assigning trust/justification are fairly low, unless we’ve assigned great importance to the beliefs in question.