How can X attain Y if “X attaining Y” is not an end that is real in some fashion? If it isn’t real in some way, it’s not attainable. Even if we’re looking at current conditions as opposed to future conditions, if X is in state A given the current conditions, why is it within state A instead of B or C? How can it determine itself to A? And if it’s possible to not be in state A, then X attaining A is only possible, but would remain a possible end, a real end in some way, even if no X is currently attaining A.
I agree that they tend towards certain ends because it’s in their nature to do so, but that doesn’t establish why it tends towards end A and not ends B, C, or D, or how it can direct itself towards certain ends being a non-intelligent thing. You also assert that it just is brute fact. Do you have any demonstration that this is true or rational? Or is your reason for declaring it brute fact as unexplainable as the brute fact?
Good. You agree with the Aristotlean on that. That was important to get out of the way. However, your appeal to “Laws of Nature” is rather useless, then. If it’s not governed by external laws of nature, then it’s governed by its own intrinsic rule set. It’s in the nature of X to tend towards Y. No need to throw in the term “law of nature”.
A scholastic understanding of metaphysics and physics does not depend on any unexplainable, ontological brute facts. If a thing is has properties that require explanation extrinsic to itself, it has an explanation.
Please provide a proof of how “what exists is only physics which is a set of brute facts.” Also, you contradicted yourself. You earlier stated that laws of nature don’t exist as real things in themselves. Things don’t tend to certain ends because of physics, physics is just a descriptor of the natures of things. So an appeal to “physics” as brute fact is again muddying the waters here. If what you said before is true, physics does not exist and is not a set of brute facts. What you should be claiming, to be consistent, is that “things exist which have brute fact natures that explain their ends and tendencies.” No? I haven’t thought about this reformulation exhaustively, but it certainly seems closer to the mark than claiming “physics exists” (as if it were a being of its own) if you earlier denied that it doesn’t. Even if we’re clear on what we’re talking about when you use the term physics in carefully defined circumstances, other readers might not, and even so, we probably want to be careful how we use the term in this discussion lest we start speaking as if it’s a collection of Platonic Forms accidentally or out of habit.
In addition to that, please provide a demonstration of how we can know what is a brute fact and what isn’t? Why is A unexplainable but B requires explanation? Why presume that anything requires explanation, or how we can know that any particular thing requires explanation?