[quote="Beryllos, post:2, topic:334564"]
I am not sure what it means to hate an inanimate object. Perhaps you could explain.
If it is immoral, I suspect it is because the hatred originates from errors in one's own way of thinking. For example, you may say that you hate a certain tree because you walked into it while looking the other way. You are mad at yourself for being so careless, but you are incorrectly blaming the tree. To make such an error, I think one must be excessively self-centered.
Hating a weapon is an interesting proposition, since weapons can be used either for offense or defense. Even nuclear weapons, it may be argued, can be held defensively (according to the principle of deterrence).
A knife can be used to prepare food, or to kill.
Similarly, free will empowered by human imagination can be used for good or evil. Should we then hate free will?
(This, my friends, is what happens when amateurs dabble in philosophy... :p)
To hate is 'not to love'. To love, (besides love being God Himself so I don't really know if mere humans (who are not also God) can articulate what exactly that means), at the very least involves willing the good of the other. In this case, the inanimate object is 'the other'.
- Something being or existing is inherently good. ("Bad things" are just privations of being, privations of goodness). (Premise)
- Something that does not exist cannot have good willed for it (since it does not exist; this would be synonymous with willing good for either a concept of the thing (which is not the same as the thing), or willing good for nothing; willing good for nothing is the same as not willing the good for anything; so something that does not exist cannot have good willed for it.) (Premise)
- It appears that there is not any other good for an inanimate object than for it to simply exist. (Premise)
- (From the above) Therefore, it appears that the only good to be willed for an inanimate object, which is currently existing, is for it to currently exist.
If not willing the good for something is the same as hating something, then (from 4), not willing an inanimate object to exist, when it does exist, is to hate an inanimate object.
Now, from 2, it can be seen that we don't need to love inanimate objects when they don't exist, so that if God were to cause an object to fall out of existence, there is an instant in which it does exist, and in which God sustains its existence and loves the object (a part of His Creation), and another instant in which God does not sustain its existence, but does not 'hate' the object since the object doesn't exist (it is no thing). Thus, God does not hate inanimate objects when He causes them to fall out of existence.
So, if what I am saying above is correct (and that's a big IF), when we actively work for an inanimate object's destruction (let's say we're destroying an enemy bunker in WW2), it would be apparently immoral to will the bunker to not exist when in fact it does exist, but it would not apparently be immoral to will the bunker to exist when it does exist, and will the bunker to not exist after you have caused a change (by blowing it up) so that it no longer exists. To be consistent with the contention of this argument, the morally correct thing for the soldier blowing up an enemy bunker to think with regards to the bunker is, "I will this bunker to exist so long as it does in fact exist, yet I further will my actions in blowing up the bunker to bring about a change such that at some future point the bunker does not exist, and at that point, when the bunker does not exist, I will the bunker (which is now nothing) to not exist".
While not hating inanimate objects seems intuitive to me, thinking it immoral to will an inanimate object to not exist when it does exist does not seem intuitive to me, although I can kinda get it, since we would be willing a fact contrary to the truth, something contrary to the real world; we would be willing a falsehood. (Willing that x not exist when it does exist).
That's just my opinion on this though...I really don't know what is right on this matter and what the Church's teachings are regarding our moral relationship to inanimate objects, except that we be "good stewards" and so forth.